

THE EURASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY COOPERATIVES



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ABSTRACT

To distinguish significant elements resulting in the failure of comprehensive security cooperatives in Eurasia, Barry Buzan's notion of a 'security complex' is useful. The five major factors motivating the Buzan's security complex of (1) social factors of ethnic, linguistic and historical significance, (2) economic factors, (3) military factors, (4) political factors, and (5) environmental factors, when juxtaposed result in an explanation of the failure of security cooperatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth (*Sodruzhestvo*) of Independent States 'Collective Security Treaty (CST), which was renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in May 2002. The term CSTO is used hereafter.

Major states or as Buzan calls them 'players in the higher-level security complex', wield significant economic and/or military advantage over most states in Eurasia. Russia and China share a range of threats that promote a security complex, they include separatist threats, threats from the US (both direct and indirect), and among other factors they maintain deep suspicions that work against a security cooperative emerging in Eurasia.

Minor states in Eurasia, which Buzan calls 'players in a lower level security complex', wield little influence outside of their immediate geographical neighbors. They are understandably concerned with terrorism, especially that stemming from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). They are often motivated to invite the US into Eurasia, but are influenced by differing levels of fear and motivation to resolve their security problems, and are motivated by differing economic incentives associated with the US in Eurasia.

There are significant issues dividing major states, yet ultimately the deep divisions between major and minor states in Eurasia operate as the greatest poison to an effective comprehensive security cooperative. In the end, a necessary precursor to any *effective* comprehensive security cooperative emerging in the Eurasian heartland is for minor Eurasian regimes to engage in multi-lateral security efforts, this entails reforming their own domestic policies, altering their stance on religious freedoms and engaging in significant economic reforms.

INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the collapse of the cooperative security that accompanied it, has resulted in a need for Eurasia to fill the security vacuum created. In broad terms, since the Cold War ended, new tensions have emerged among the new republics, accompanied by a sharp rise in trans-border terrorism and certain Eurasian security vacuum anxieties. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, together with the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Russia's war with General Dudaev's Chechens, border disputes, a distrust of the motivations of the United States' (US) military-industrial complex¹, authoritarian and totalitarian governments in Central Asia, hydro-carbon politics, a lack of access to water² and mineral resources and outbreaks of HIV/AIDS³, anthrax, plague, typhoid and rabies in Central Asia⁴, – constitute only a portion of Eurasia's ethnic, religious, environmental and security concerns.

The need for a regional response to regional threats is clear, and is widely accepted.⁵ So the failure for an effective Eurasian comprehensive security cooperative to emerge is explored here by way of Barry Buzan's dictum of the security complex.⁶ A 'security complex' occurs where a group of states share an array of significant and shared security concerns and their response to such concerns are so closely similar that national security concerns cannot realistically be seen as unique from each other.⁷ A security complex analysis utilizes security analysis at the macro level of major powers on the system, examines middle level regional relations and also the micro level of analyzing domestic dynamics in all states, be they major or minor.⁸

¹ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Global Security Norms", *the Washington Quarterly*, 27:2, Spring 2004, pp. 67-8.

² Rustam Burnastev, "On a Possibility of having a Regional Security Complex in Central Asia", *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No.1, 2001, para 26.

³ Department for International Development, Central Asia, South Caucasus & Moldova, *Central Asia: South Caucasus & Moldova: Regional Assistance Plan*, June 2004, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/rapcascm.pdf>, accessed 14 September 2004, p. 3.

⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Kazakhstan: Anthrax and Haemorrhagic Fever Cases Confirmed", Monday 12 July 2004, *IRINNEWS.ORG*.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Uzbekistan: Fear of Plague Leads to Tighter Border with Turkmenistan" Monday 12 July 2004, *IRINNEWS.ORG*.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Rabies Remains Endemic in the South", 17 August 2004, *IRINNEWS.ORG*.

⁵ Terrence Hopman, Stephen D. Shenfield, Dominique Arel, *Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security*, Final Report of a Research Project Coordinated by the Program on Global Security: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies – Brown University, Occasional Paper #30, 1997, p. 42.

President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan has persistently advocated the necessity of cooperative integration for the post-Soviet states, most notably in his proposal of June 1994 for a Eurasian Union.

⁶ Bruno Coppieters, "The Caucasus as a Security Complex", *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, VUB Press, 1996, p. 91.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, New York, Harreter Wheatshaf, 1991, p. 222.

A 'security complex' asserts that regional threats should not be understood as belonging only to a set of autonomous sovereign states. Rather, threats may result in affected states closely uniting so as to allow the correlation of geographical boundaries with other regional formations. Five major factors motivate Buzan's security complex, they are (1) social factors of ethnic, linguistic and historical significance, (2) economic factors, (3) military factors, (4) political factors and (5) environmental factors related to the eco-system.⁹ Although all five factors need not all exist to result in Buzan's definition of the security complex.

By examining threats through the framework of a security complex, security cooperatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth (*Sodruzhestvo*) of Independent States' Collective Security Treaty Organization¹⁰ can have their failures understood in the post-Soviet space.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF A SECURITY COMPLEX TO A SECURITY COOPERATIVE

History reflects that *the existence of a security complex is a necessary precursor to an effective comprehensive security cooperative*.¹¹ Where states do not share sufficiently similar security threats, and where there is no consensus on the manner in which such threats are to be dealt with, then a formalized arrangement of a comprehensive security cooperative will lack the impetus to succeed in their operational effectiveness.

It is often argued that the incompatible motivations and deep suspicions in Eurasia mean that a Eurasian 'security complex' has not, and will not, emerge in the near future.¹² By implication then, neither can a more formalized security cooperative emerge in Eurasia, that is, with any chance of operational success.

By this logic, a lack of a security complex will spoil the growth of an operationally effective comprehensive security cooperative. Yet, aside from claims of competing interests and their partial validity, it is also possible

⁹ Hooman Peiman, *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia*, London, Praeger, 1998, p. 18.

¹⁰ The Charter of the CSTO was approved in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on 7 October 2002.

¹¹ Robert Legvold, "Great Power Stakes in Central Asia", *Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, Cambridge: MIT Press 2003, p. 1.

to demonstrate that some impetus towards a security complex already exists in Eurasia, even though Eurasia's comprehensive security cooperatives are currently operational failures for reasons explained herein. This claim may appear contradictory, yet occurs as a 'security complex' does not inexorably lead to a 'successful' security cooperative. Rather the existence of a security complex improves the feasibility of a security cooperative, but as the SCO and CSTO demonstrate, this cannot guarantee cooperation and success.

For the most part, the security complex analysis in this report suggests that the current operational failure of both the SCO and the CSTO need not be a fatal condition. There are factors which currently frustrate the effectiveness of both organizations, but when such factors are understood in the context of the security complex, many of these flaws could be remedied to allow a more formalized comprehensive security cooperative to eventually emerge.

MAJOR PLAYERS AND A EURASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX

Major actors, or as Buzan calls them 'players in the higher-level security complex', wield a significant economic and/or military advantage over most states in Eurasia.¹³ Thereby, Russia, China, Iran, the US, Turkey, Pakistan, India¹⁴ and Israel¹⁵ are all *potentially* strong 'Eurasian actors'.

Russia and China share a range of threats that promote a security complex, they include separatist threats, threats from the US (both direct and indirect), and among other factors they maintain deep suspicions that work against a security cooperative emerging in Eurasia.

¹² Dmitri Trenin, *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, VUBPress, Brussels, 1996, p.91.

¹³ Buzan, *as above n. 8*, p. 195.

¹⁴ Stephen Blank, "India's Rising Profile in Central Asia", *Comparative Strategy*, 22: 2003, pp. 139-157.

¹⁵ Matthew Edwards, "The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder", *Central Asian Survey*, Mar 2003, 22(1),p.83.

Shared Russo-Chinese ‘separatists threats’ include the escalating violence stemming from Tibet, Xinjiang province¹⁶ and Chechnya. This fear is exacerbated by shared fears of both US and NATO’s interventionist doctrines; NATO’s 1999 Kosovo operation is an example. Furthermore, the independence of the Turkic states of the former USSR can be perceived as an incentive for separatist movements to pursue and fight for their independence. Consequently Russia, China and Iran, all fear that the US and/or NATO may manipulate vulnerable elements of their domestic politics to destabilize their security, and promotes a security complex.¹⁷

Arguably such separatist orientated security fears have an economic solution. China and presumably Russia, hope that increasing cross border trade with separatist regions will alleviate Uyghur and Chechen separatist aspirations. Greater cooperation with Eurasian states may solve certain Chinese and Russian security anxieties, especially if a security cooperative could effectively limit militant Islam’s influence and promote an economic bloc. Such initiatives can partially appease separatist motivations by increased security and wealth.

Fear of direct US military threats gives rise to a security complex between Russia and China. Since 2002, China and Russia have felt threatened by the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The US has also began to build new weapons systems such as a hypersonic missile to defy another power’s defenses, and have developed a low-yield ‘bunker-buster’ nuclear missile – that can surgically remove heavily reinforced underground bunkers. Thereby, the new US weapons initiatives serve a threatening offensive purpose. China feasibly influenced by the US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, has continued development on missiles that attack command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and

¹⁶ The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a militant Islamic movement founded by Uyghurs, the Turkic-speaking ethnic majority in the Xinjiang province of China. China fears that they could fragment if regional separatist movements ever gained ground. In the post- 11 September period, China advised the Bush administration that the ETIM has links with Al-Qaeda. In August 2002, after months of pressure from China, the Bush administration announced it would freeze the group’s U.S. assets. Reliable information about the ETIM is hard to come by, and they disagree about the extent of the ETIM’s terrorist activities and its link to trans-national terrorism.

Chinese Deputy Director of Public Security Ma Mingyue has claimed that Uyghur terrorists with ties to East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are hiding in Lahore and Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

¹⁷ Iwashita Akihiro, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” after the Post-Cold War Period”, http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-1_Iwashita.pdf, accessed 5 September 2004, p. 6.

At the SCO Bishkek summit in 1999, the leaders all recognized the threat of “Islamic fundamentalism” and declared their criticism of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as “humanitarian interference” from the outside in domestic matters. This trend was accelerated mainly by Russia and China; both states needed support for each government’s policy of repressing its “domestic minority problem,” i.e. Chechnya and Xinjiang.

reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. China has shut down public discussions of its military collaboration with Russia, pertaining to missile defenses and missiles, suggesting a strong security complex relationship.

The US agenda in Eurasia has been described as ‘ensuring that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the US or even diminish its decisive role’.¹⁸ Since the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the seed of Russian-US arms racing has re-emerged. Russia has successfully tested hypersonic missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead along with its ground-based mobile TOPOL-M ICBM.¹⁹ Russia claims the hypersonic missile can overcome any missile defense and has declared that their missiles will "affect the whole philosophy of military-strategic interaction". Surely such declassified remarks are directed at the US.

The analysis above demonstrates that China and Russia have some impetus towards a security complex. Yet tensions in the Russo-Chinese relationship are also significant, they include disputes over the initiative to develop an oil pipeline route to China, the Trans-Korean railroad’s direction, and Chinese efforts to gain access to energy companies in Russia or Central Asia.²⁰ To illustrate such suspicions, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Vyacheslav Trubnikov’s critical statements on China’s military presence in Eurasia could potentially unravel the emerging security complex and spoil an emerging ‘effective’ security cooperative.²¹

Russian suspicions of the US military-industrial complex promote an impetus for Russian and Iranian involvement in an anti-US security complex. Dmitri Trenin claims that the Russia’s nuclear power ministry Minatom see the US policy as motivated by a desire to eliminate Minatom as a credible competitor for global nuclear industries.²² Russia feel they have been persistently criticized by the US for assisting in the construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor, yet counter that the Clinton administration’s plan to build light-water reactor for North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework Plan is equivalent to Russia’s relationship with Iran.²³ Therefore, Russians see the US as seeking profit, before security.

¹⁸ Bulent Gokay, “Oil, War and Geopolitics from Kosovo to Afghanistan”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 4, No.1, 2002, p.7.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geo-strategy for Asia”, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997.

¹⁹ The Topol-M is a 3-stage solid-fuel missile with a length of 17.9metres (not including the 3.3metre forward section which contains the payload), a diameter of 1.86metres, and launch weight of 47.2 metric tons. Like many Soviet era missiles, it was designed to be deployed and maintained in a launch canister. Both the silo-based and mobile variants have been designed for cold launch. It has a maximum range in excess of 10,000km.

²⁰ Stephen Blank, “Is the Shanghai Cooperative Organization Cracking?”, *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, Wednesday / 19 May, 2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2378 , accessed 15 August 2004.

²¹ Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia”, as above n. 14.

²² Trenin, as above n. 1, pp. 67-8.

²³ *Ibid.*

Hydro-carbon interests unsurprisingly unite numerous Eurasian states. Aside from possible Russian oil routes, Iran enters a security complex by offering the only other feasible land route to the West and the Persian Gulf for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.²⁴

Economic profit may not seem consistent with the security complex dictum. However economic interests, as are so often the case, evolve into security threats²⁵, especially so given the US sanctions on Iran and threats towards Iran's influence in Eurasia. Examples include the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage's aggressive rebuke of Iran's 'oil' posturing in the Eurasia, he stated "we will not stand idly by and watch them (Iran) pressure their neighbors",²⁶ and G.W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in the 'axis of evil' – provides an impetus for Iran to engage in a security complex, out of fear.

Ultimately Iran, Russia and China share a security complex. All three states share an interest in removing the US influence from Eurasia. Iran is also seeking to solidify the pact with Russia and China. In 2000, Russia received the defacto support of Iran, (the then chair of the Islamic Conference Organization), in Russia's fight against Chechnya's separatist movement. Iran has also discouraged any attempt by its Muslim partners to criticize Russia publicly for their treatment of Chechen resistance.²⁷ Such statements will comfort both Russia and China in their dealings with separatists.

MINOR STATES IN A EURASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX

Minor states, which Buzan calls 'players in a lower level security complex', wield little influence outside of their immediate geographical neighbors.²⁸ Yet there is a tendency among analysts to treat Central Asia and even the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) as a region of equivalents. To be sure, there are similarities among these states, but similarities should not be overstated. Minor states in Eurasia are understandably concerned with terrorism, especially that stemming from the IMU. They are often motivated to invite the US into Eurasia but are influenced by differing levels of fear and motivation to resolve their security problems, and are motivated by differing economic incentives associated with the US in Eurasia.

²⁴ Mohammadreza Farzanegan, "Iranian Options Most Economically Viable for Exporting Caspian Oil", *Oil and Gas Journal*; 17 March 2003; 101, pp. 22-3.

²⁵ Buzan, as above n. 8, p. 201

²⁶ Maureen Lorenzetti, "US Warns Iran about Meddling With its Caspian Interest", *Oil and Gas Journal*, 18 March 2002; 100, p. 34.

²⁷ Trenin, as above n.1, p. 67.

²⁸ Buzan, as above n. 8, p. 195.

Eurasian leaders are mostly authoritarian or totalitarian; as such they are loathed to delegate power to a comprehensive security cooperative where their influence will be significantly less than China and Russia. Yet ethnic ratios, their geographical proximity to failing states like Afghanistan, and each state's natural wealth and public policies differ. Security complex analysis and the operational success of a comprehensive security cooperative must be viewed against an informed understanding of such differences.

Drug related threats (narco-terrorism); pose a serious threat to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Countries with economies in transition have substantial social and economic obstacles that hamper drug control efforts, and the 'Balkans route' across Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe is widely used by drug dealers to move drugs westward, promoting corruption along the way. Thereby, there is some impetus for a security complex. Yet, the level of threat experienced by those sharing borders with the opium trafficking state of Afghanistan is greatest. Thereby the political-will to implement urgent drug-trafficking initiatives is not uniform across Eurasia. For some states, hydro-carbon polarize their attention in lieu of issues considered less crucial, despite that militant terrorism, drug trafficking and energy security are often interrelated with oil.

Militant Islamism poses a universal threat. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are continuing to struggle with Islamist terrorism emanating from the IMU. There are indications that the IMU insurgency is broadening in its popular appeal, motivated by declining economic conditions and political repression. There is also evidence suggesting that the IMU is developing into a pan-Central Asian movement.²⁹ The threat to Eurasia is universal, yet the quantum of the threat differs. The Ferghana valley which straddles the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, harbors high numbers of militant Islamists. Whilst there is a security complex for these three states, most of Eurasia does not share the quantum of militant threat shared by these three, and as discussed below, these three harbor mutual distrusts for each other. Thereby the impetus for Eurasia to solve Central Asian's security threats *with priority* to their own is not likely. Yet hydro-carbon pipeline security is relative to militant Islam, and provides an impetus for Eurasian cohesion to combat the militant bases in the Ferghana valley that threaten pipeline security.

Deep suspicions frustrate the emergence of a Eurasian security cooperative. Uzbekistan regularly alleges that elements of Tajikistan's coalition government have aided the IMU by allowing their basing areas inside of Tajikistan's borders.³⁰ Uzbekistan has since placed landmines on its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, resulting in numerous (unnecessary) civilian casualties. Landmines were also placed in disputed territories. Likewise, Kyrgyzstan has destabilized their relationship with Tajikistan, by placing landmines on its borders shared with Tajikistan and has used explosives to collapse a mountain pass between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to the anger of Tajikistan.³¹ Such significant regional destabilization also occurs in the Caucasus.

In the Trans-Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia share a security complex of sorts. It is based partly on the region's ancient history and strong ethnic pride, which distinguishes them from Central Asians. The truncated research below illustrates elements promoting security complexes and that contra.

Armenia, has occupied approximately 20% of Azerbaijan since the war over Nagorno Karabakh (after 1994). Iran tries to preserve a peaceful coexistence with Armenia, despite the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian occupation of a large part of Azeri territory. Azerbaijan's religious affinity with Iran (both states have a Shiite majority) has not led to close co-operation between the Shiite states. In fact both Armenia and Azerbaijan still view Iran as a former imperial overlord, and for reasons discussed later in this report, have reorientated themselves towards the US through NATO's Partnership for Peace Program.³²

Georgia is attractive as a member of a security cooperative, due to its geographic position serving as a transport link to the Black Sea and to Turkey and its political attractiveness as a benign state with no ambitions to become a dominating power. Georgia however suffers from severe domestic conflict, illustrated by the 'rose revolution'.³³ The Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are increasingly subject to

²⁹ Rashid Ahmed "IMU Gradually Developing into Pan-Central Asian Movement", *Eurasia Insight*, 3 April 2001.

³⁰ Tanya Charlick-Paley, Phil Williams, Olga Olikier, "The Political Evolution of Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications for Regional Security", *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003, p. 33.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Edmund Herzig, *The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, London, Institute of International Affairs, 1999, p. 52.

³³ "The Rose Revolution" is named after the red rose that radical opposition leader Mikael Saakashvili held aloft after he and his supporters stormed the Georgian parliament building on 22 November – to topple Eduard Shevardnadze's regime.

secessionist movements.³⁴ The Pankisi Gorge is constituted of Chechen refugees, and allegedly Al Qaeda leaders and Chechen leaders.³⁵ This leads to a security complex between Georgia and Russia, given the mutual struggle with the growth of militant Islam and secessionists. What stops a Russian-Georgian security complex solidifying into an effective security cooperative are deep suspicions for Georgian are alleging that Russians are manipulating their Georgian security by arming South Ossetian separatists and also massing Russian troops along the North Ossetian border.³⁶

Azerbaijan has become a major potential player in global gas markets and has introduced substantial uncertainty as to Azerbaijan's involvement in a security complex. The logical market for Azerbaijani gas is Turkey. This creates a potential conflict of interest between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over Turkey's markets that will complicate a Eurasian cooperation over pipeline route issues.

Russia is also a competitor for the Turkish market in the form of 'Blue Stream' pipeline project from Russia across the Black Sea to northern Turkey.³⁷ Consequently, Azerbaijan's arrival on the gas scene may worsen Russian-Azerbaijani relations still further, as well as reducing whatever interest Russia might have in cooperating towards a settlement of the Karabakh question, an interest that has already been undermined by recent events in Dagestan and the closure of the northern route through Chechnya.

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Turkey and US support the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which may move 50 million metric tons of oil per year to the Mediterranean, to sweeten the Baku-Ceyhan deal the US has offered at least Turkey \$833,000 to support the planning process.³⁸ Yet Russia and Iran are two suffering economies that oppose the pipeline.³⁹ They believe that the pipeline is intended to break the Russian monopoly on oil, and that the pipeline route bypasses Iran at the behest of the US.⁴⁰

³⁴ Herzig, as above n.32, p.39.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Eurasian Security Watch, "A Fragile Peace in Georgia", *Eurasian Security Watch*, No. 47, 26 August 2004.

Mevlut Katik, "Blue Stream Pipeline's Future in Doubt amid Russian-Turkish Pricing Dispute", *Eurasianet*, Monday, 20 September 2004, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav060203a.shtml>, accessed 20 September 2004.

³⁸ Mariano Alierta, "Economic and Strategic Stakes in the Caspian Energy Markets", *NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-Committee on East-West Economic Cooperation and Convergence, Rapporteur*, Spain, <http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1999/econ-col99.pdf>, accessed 5 September 2004.

³⁹ Ali A. Jalali, "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 2001-02, p. 7, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/jalali.htm>, p.7, accessed 2/08/2004.

⁴⁰ Ali A. Jalali, "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran", *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 2001-02, pp. 98-111.

Furthermore, if Eurasian interstate cooperation has interconnected security and economic dimensions, then so too is the converse true. That is, a lack of interconnectedness has implications for state and regional security. A significant factor frustrating cooperation among Central Asian states regardless of whether that cooperation is through the SCO or the CSTO is economic. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are pro-reform (liberalising) economies, whereas Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have a statist (isolationist) economy.⁴¹

Gregory Gleason illustrates how incompatible domestic policies may antagonize another through Uzbekistan juxtaposed with neighboring Kazakhstan.⁴² Uzbekistan's maintains subsidies for basic goods such as flour, Uzbekistan's price is fixed at less than a third of production costs, yet Uzbek flour is smuggled away to Kazakhstan and being sold at market prices.⁴³ Smuggling drains Uzbekistan's economy and fuels tension among minor states of Eurasia that will spoil the emergence of a security cooperative.

THE PROLIFERATION OF COOPERATIVES IN EURASIA POISONS EFFECTIVENESS

The mass of Eurasian regional security cooperatives include the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) which has replaced the Central Asian Economic Commonwealth, the Eurasian Economic Cooperation Commonwealth (EEC); the GUUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova); the Collective Forces of Quick Deployment (CFQD) of the Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). They form multilateral efforts pursuing joint regional cooperation solutions.

The symptom of failing security cooperatives stems from Eurasian multilateral institutions emerging in plague proportions and their overlapping of functions and goals. Examples include the overlap between the CIS Antiterrorist Center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and the SCO Antiterrorist Center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Such inefficiencies increase the time and cost spent on summits, debates, and overheads whilst delaying the deployment of tactical missions.

⁴¹ Gregory Gleason, "Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 53, No.7, 2001, p. 1082.

⁴² Gleason, as above n24, pp. 1085-6.

Further to the proliferation of security cooperatives, every Eurasian state is a member of much larger cooperatives like the United Nations and many are involved with NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). The PfP Framework Document was signed in 1994 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and later on by Tajikistan on 20 February, 2002.⁴⁴ All three Caucasian states are members of the OSCE and the PfP also.⁴⁵ Azerbaijan and particularly Georgia are using the PfP to reorient themselves towards the US and the West generally, in an effort to reduce their dependence on Russia.⁴⁶ Of course, inviting the US into the Caucasus poses security threats to Iran, Russia and China. The proliferation of Eurasian cooperatives which focus partly or fully on security issues, can in part explain the failures of the SCO and the CSTO.

(i) CASE STUDY: THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The SCO was established at the Shanghai summit of 26 April, 1996, by the Shanghai five (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).⁴⁷ Russia has invited India, Iran, and Uzbekistan (who does not border China) into the SCO.

The April 1996 SCO summit established a Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions.⁴⁸ The Moscow summit in 1997, adopted the Treaty on the Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. Other SCO summits have included the matters of strengthening confidence and stability in the region and enhancing trade and economic cooperation, combating national separatism, religious extremism, trans-border crime and cooperation on fighting international terrorism. On 15 June 2001 a Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO and a Convention on 'Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism' was adopted.⁴⁹ The seventh summit developed an 'Agreement on Setting up the Regional Antiterrorist Organization' (RATO) based in Tashkent and the Declaration by the Heads of Member States of the SCO.⁵⁰ The eighth summit in Moscow on 29 May, 2003 located the SCO Secretariat in Shanghai and moved the RATO Headquarters in Tashkent.⁵¹

As can be seen in the extensive list of subjects covered in the SCO summits, there is no shortage of expensive junket-style SCO summits. But the SCO has a checkered history on terrorism issues.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security, *Russia and Central Asia*, <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/CentralAsia.html>, accessed 15 September 2004.

⁴⁵ Herzig, as above n. 32, p. 52.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Farkhod Tolipov, "On the Role of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization Within the SCO", *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No.3 (27), 2004, p. 146.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

To date, the SCO has achieved some success in dealing with border delimitation and demilitarization.⁵² In 1994 the Russo-Chinese 50 kilometer border and the Kazakh-Chinese were agreed upon. In 1998, the Kyrgyzstan-Chinese supplemental agreement was signed over four of five of their disputed regions, the fifth disputed region was demarcated at the fourth SCO summit in 1999, and in 2000 the Kyrgyz-Tajik-Chinese border dispute was resolved. However, concern has been expressed over the equity of that demarcation.⁵³ Since the demarcation and delimitation focus, SCO focus has shifted to Islamic militancy, but with less success.

One cause for the SCO failures in tackling Islamic militancy is that border delimitation and demilitarization are mostly the province of governmental decisions, such policy reforms do not require vast infrastructure, comprehensive coordination of SCO members or community support. Rather, cooperation is only required between governments, and with minimal financial and political cost. The threat of Islamic militancy is a more complex challenge for the SCO; it requires a unified and continuous approach be taken to the problem across the entire membership of the SCO – as militant safe-havens and bases must be targeted, at a considerable cost. Unilateralism on its own has proven inadequate to address asymmetric threats such as terrorism. And for states like Uzbekistan, their style of unilateralism employed is oppressive and backward.

Minor states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan lacks the impetus for serious cooperation with the major states of the SCO. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan perceive their security threats to be terrorism from the IMU and interstate water disputes; and not threats emanating from the US. Of course this suits the US agenda, and may partly explain the US uncritical tolerance of totalitarian regimes.

The US by many accounts operates as a wedge by preventing Eurasian cohesion – they use economic influence to divide the minor states from the major states, and aid money carries no serious good governance conditionality. On the US economic presence, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported that US imports from Central Asia totaled US \$570.3 million in 2003 and US exports amounted to \$548.1 million.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Akihiro, as above n. 17, p. 263.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Central Asia: US Trade Pact Seen as Unlikely to Yield Immediate Benefits” Sunday 22 August 2004, *IRINNEWS.ORG*.

Kazakhstan accounts for more than 80 percent of US investments in Central Asia. Kanat Saudabayev, Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the US has since stated "this agreement will convey a new impulse to economic cooperation among signatory countries on bilateral and multilateral levels."⁵⁵ For Kyrgyzstan, the American University campus established in 1997, stands as a symbol of the US structural help and illustrates the long term role that the US sees itself playing in the region.⁵⁶

For major states such as Iran, Russia and China, the impetus for a security complex to emerge is real. It is motivated by (i) a loss of security and prestige resulting from the US presence, threats and influence in Eurasia, (ii) regional threats posed by militant-Islamists from Afghanistan, (iii) developing a capacity to respond to separatist movements and trans-border terrorism, and (iv) energy politics in Eurasia. It is further evidenced by an increasing presence in regional organizations, of which the SCO is one relevant example.

The Taliban and militant Islam pose a concern for Iran, China and Russia. At the SCO meeting in Astana on 30 March 2000, the defense ministers of the Shanghai Five (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) addressed the issues of separatism and terrorism in the context of developments in Chechnya, Xinjiang province, and Afghanistan, which Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev called "a headache" for all five states.⁵⁷ More recently the Taliban threat has reemerged, as the Taliban regrouping after their initial overthrow in 2002. Iran has long been the victim of much Taliban violence, and China shares a similar security threat from the Taliban as does Russia.⁵⁸ In mid-April 2000, the security chiefs of the SCO have agreed that the Afghan Taliban is a significant threat to regional stability.

The consensus remedy of the SCO is to consolidate military ties for joint strikes against nationalist separatism, religious extremism, narco-terrorism and the protection of regional security and stability. Yet resolutions on the Taliban stop short of efforts to address related organizations like the IMU. For the SCO to succeed in addressing terrorism, drug trafficking and other tensions, Uzbekistan must partake in Eurasian cooperatives. Thereby the major Eurasians of China, Russia and Iran share a security complex but will not succeed in drawing the SCO into an effective security cooperative until Uzbekistan are cooperating members.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Kyrgyzstan: Diminishing US Presence Raises Concern", Sunday 22 August 2004, *IRINNEWS.ORG*.

⁵⁷ ITAR-TASS News Agency, 30 March 2000, <http://www.itar-tass.com/>; Julie M. Rahm, "Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?" *Parameters*, Winter, 2001-02, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01winter/rahm.htm>, accessed 5 September 2004.

⁵⁸ Theodore Karasik, "Russian Threat to Strike Afghanistan Tests Central Asian Partners", *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, Wednesday, 21 June, 2000.

(ii) CASE STUDY: THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991.⁵⁹ At present the CIS is made up of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.⁶⁰ On 15 May, 1992, nine members - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – signed the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST), which constituted the basis for the security pact among the CIS countries.⁶¹ Three of the twelve CIS members, being the Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan - never joined the CST/CSTO.

Since the 1992 ratification to the CST, Uzbekistan's relationship with the US and tense relations with Russia prompted Uzbekistan to leave the CST in May 1999.⁶² Yet, after the February 1999 Tashkent bombings and subsequent incursions from the IMU, President Karimov publicly declared his recognition of "Russia's interests in Uzbekistan" during a December 1999 visit by President Putin to Tashkent. As such, there seems to be an impetus for a security complex with Uzbekistan and CST members, but no regional comprehensive security cooperative has emerged that includes Uzbekistan's formalized involvement, and for many of the same reasons in the SCO analysis, undermines the CSTO.

At the February 1995 CIS summit for heads of state in Alma Ata, Azerbaijan refused to allow Russian troops based on its border with Iran to participate in a unified CIS air defence system.⁶³ Azerbaijan's foreign policy presidential advisor, Vafa Goulizade, announced on 9 February 1999 that his country would not renew its membership in the CST. Russia's sale of weapons to Armenia spoils a security complex emerging and so no cooperative approach via the CIS will emerge. Georgia pulled out of the CST in 1999, at the same time as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. The rationale behind the mass exodus from the CST can be traced to allegations of Russia's domination of the CSTO.

⁵⁹ The Charter of the CSTO was approved in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on 7 October 2002.

⁶⁰ Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth Independent States, CISSTAT Website, <http://www.cisstat.com/eng/>, accessed 15 August 2004.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Robert M. Cutler, "The Shattering of the Sino-Russian Entente over the Shape of Central Asia?" *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, Wednesday / 21 November, 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=59, accessed 15 August 2004.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in the non-exhaustive security complex analysis developed earlier in this report, Eurasia's incomplete transition to democracy has resulted in security policies that do not operate in the best interests of the Eurasian regional security. Authoritarian and totalitarian leaders maintain tight control over individual liberties and create many of their own security threats as a result. Inevitably opposition movements emerge to challenge established and repressive regimes; such oppressive policies directed at groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) ("Party of Islamic Liberation") promote conversions to militant groups like the IMU and Al-Qaeda.

Authoritarian and totalitarian leaders want and rely on US aid and trade, yet loath sharing the power and creating the infrastructure that is required for any *effective* security cooperative. Hence Eurasian states currently prefer unilateral or bilateral security initiatives rather than comprehensive 'multilateral' security cooperatives. Or alternatively, minor states participate in summits on Eurasian security cooperates, but do not act on their obligations borne in the SCO and CSTO security summits and their subsequent legal obligations.

States like Uzbekistan, despite being a minor player in a Eurasian security complex are significant in spoiling an effective Eurasian security cooperative emerging. Farkhod Tolipov⁶⁴ and Malia K. Du Mont⁶⁵ claim that the CSTO (and by association the CST and also the SCO) has not achieved impressive results because Uzbekistan remains outside their scope. Yet the SCO and the CSTO will not secure Uzbekistan's involvement in the near future for their leverage (aid and trade) has been usurped by the US's willingness to accommodate bad governance. The US endorses the listing of the non-militant HT as a terrorist organization, and only feigns a desire to reform Karimov's regime. That is, despite the regime feasibly turning non-militants towards militant Islam by oppressing non-militants.

Other factors resulting in a failure of Eurasian security cooperatives can in part be traced to the influences from the periphery. Eurasian cohesion is extra-complicated as the only region where the presence of the five nuclear powers of Russia, China, the US, Pakistan, India and even Israel as a sixth⁶⁶, play a corrupting role. Even among these

⁶³ Bruno Coppieters, "Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex", *Contested Border in the Caucasus*, VUBPress, Brussels, 1996, p. 198.

⁶⁴ Tolipov, as above n. 47.

⁶⁵ China-Eurasian Forum, *QEF Quarterly Newsletter*, June 2004, <http://www.chinaeurasia.org/Newsletter.html>, accessed 18 September 2004.

⁶⁶ Efraim Inbar, "Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2001, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/inbar.pdf>, accessed 5 September 2004.

Israel, has located a Mossad base in the city of Baku in Azerbaijan, and has constructed listening stations along the Caspian and Iranian border. Further still, Israel support Karimov's totalitarian regime in Uzbekistan and the Turkish-Israeli entente generates a security threat in Eurasia. Thereby the mistrust

nuclear states, deep suspicions mean that for the moment at least, Russian Ex-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's vision of excluding the US from Eurasia through a strategic triangle between China, Russia and another, will not occur even among states with a deep distrust of the US presence.⁶⁷

In concluding on the failure of Eurasian security cooperatives such as the SCO and CSTO, the underlying Eurasian security complex means the factors currently frustrating the emergence of an effective security cooperative in Eurasia need not be fatal to the CSTO or the SCO's future success.

In coming decades, the US's geographical dislocation from Eurasia, their over-extension and competing interests around the world, and US/NATO's inability and even their disinterest in responding to sources of Eurasian threats provides an impetus for Eurasian security cooperatives to fulfill their potential.⁶⁸

Ideally a security cooperative will be formalized upon a desire to contain militant Islam and to respond to environmental threats facing Eurasia. Yet the more realistic forecast is that an effective Eurasian security cooperative may emerge to provide hydro-carbon pipeline security. Another interesting possibility is that an anti-US security complex emerging between Russia, China and Iran will solidify into a comprehensive security cooperative. A claim reflected in increasing anti-American sentiments leveled at the SCO.⁶⁹

Of course, any effective security cooperative in Eurasia faces massive logistical tasks that must overcome factors operating against the security complex solidifying into a security cooperative. If an effective security cooperative emerges, it will be preceded by domestic and international pressure on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Eurasia. A necessary precursor to any *effective* security cooperative emerging in the Eurasian heartland is for minor totalitarian regimes to engage in reforming their own domestic security policies, altering their stance on religious freedoms and engaging in significant open market reforms.

over Turkey's imperial past and the perceived pro-Western orientation of both Israel and Turkey leads to deep suspicion of their involvement in Eurasia. For these reasons, with the possible exception of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, a security complex even in the broadest definition of the term, does not exist between Turkey and Israel and Eurasians.

⁶⁷ Julie M. Rahm, "Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?", *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, p. 87.

⁶⁸ Ted Weihman, "US Focus on Interdiction in Central Asia is Inadequate to Meet Drug Trafficking Challenge – Expert", 23 September 2003, Eurasia Insight, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092303a_pr.shtml, accessed 21 September 2004.

⁶⁹ Yuri Bossin, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: between Political Ambition and Economic Pragmatism", *NIASnytt*, No. 2, 2004, p. 15. Cutler, as above n.62.

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